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 “Negotiated” Transparency? 
Corporate Citizenship Engagement and Environmental Disclosure 
 
Abstract 
Corporate stakeholder relations are historically typified by power imbalances and mistrust, but in recent 
times, they are increasingly characterized by ‘dialogue’ based on mutual understanding and creative action.  
In this paper we consider corporate engagements with two external stakeholder groups, citizenship-focused 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) and institutional investors, and examine the potential association 
between these engagements and corporate disclosure of environmental information.  Based on a sample of 
183 firms over a three-year time period, we analyze the relationships between NGO engagement, investor 
activism and the quality of corporate voluntary environmental disclosure.  Our findings suggest that 
engagement with skills-focused NGOs and the withdrawal of shareholder resolutions, as mechanisms for 
dialogue and negotiation, are strongly related to higher quality disclosure.  We conclude with discussion of 
our findings in terms of modern governance structures influencing transparency in the corporate sector as 
well as comment on how corporate citizenship may, indeed, be making a difference. 
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 “Negotiated” Transparency? 
Corporate Citizenship Engagement and Environmental Disclosure 
Corporate citizenship calls for businesses to not only meet their economic and legal requirements 
but also the ethical and discretionary responsibilities imposed on them by their stakeholders (Maignan & 
Ferrell, 2000).  In pursuit of the ethical and discretionary, corporate stakeholder relations are historically 
typified by power imbalances and mistrust (Poncelet, 2003). Recently, however, they are increasingly 
characterized by ‘dialogue’ based on mutual understanding and creative action (Halal, 2001; O’Connell et 
al., 2005).  Is this dialogue, as a representative outcome of corporate citizenship-inspired policy, having an 
impact?  In this paper we consider corporate engagements with two external stakeholder groups, 
citizenship-focused non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and institutional investors, and examine the 
potential association between these engagements and corporate disclosure of environmental information.  
Evidence of the impact of engagement with stakeholders, in terms of enhanced transparency, might 
suggest that, indeed, corporate citizenship is making a difference. 
Over the past 10 years both NGOs and institutional investors have become increasingly active in 
pursuing the common objective of corporate environmental transparency (Aguilera, 2005; Busco et al., 
2005; Clark & Hebb, 2004; Fombrun, 2006; Mirvis & Googins, 2006).  And, corporations are increasingly 
disclosing environmental, and to some degree social, impacts and performance (KPMG, 2002, 2005).   
However, the extent to which corporate-NGO engagement and institutional investor activism are leading to 
greater transparency remains uncertain.  Thus, in the search for a partial answer to the overriding question 
in this special issue, the objective of this study is to determine the impacts of engagement between these 
two stakeholders and corporations on the quality of voluntary environmental disclosure by corporations. 
Environmental transparency infers ‘beyond-compliance’ disclosure of information by a firm; such 
disclosure increases external stakeholders’, including investors and NGOs, abilities to assess the validity of 
claims made by firms and thereby make more informed decisions (Perrini, 2006).  Collecting and reporting 
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environmental information provides an opportunity for a firm to identify its level of competence in corporate 
citizenship as well as engage in dialogue with stakeholders (Perrini, 2006).  Examining the impacts of 
investor activism and corporate engagement with citizenship-oriented NGOs may help understand why 
some firms disclose high quality non-financial information.  These two potential mechanisms for motivating 
and enabling corporate transparency manifest as direct dialogue, information sharing and negotiations 
between management and external stakeholders.  The question remains, however, if either or both of these 
mechanisms actually lead to higher quality disclosure by firms.   
Dialogue with institutional investors and citizenship-oriented NGOs on key citizenship issues 
provides corporate management with an understanding of stakeholder information needs and the means to 
provide the information in a useful, meaningful form (Clark & Hebb, 2004; Lazlo et al., 2005).  This dialogue 
provides an important avenue to learning to corporate management.  NGOs are diverse, however, with 
different missions, objectives and approaches to corporate engagement (Freeman, 1999; Winn, 2001).   
Thus, we also seek to provide insights into how different types of NGOs may be influencing corporate 
environmental disclosure. Figure 1 below illustrates the relationships between corporate-NGO engagement, 
investor activism and the quality of environmental disclosure that we explore in this paper. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Theoretical Model 
Voluntary Environmental Disclosure 
As a primary manifestation of corporate transparency, reporting informs internal and external 
stakeholders of the operations and status of an organization.  Increased corporate risk associated with 
environmental and social issues has resulted in increased pressure from shareholders, government 




Voluntary Environmental Disclosures.  Berthelot et al. (2003) define corporate environmental 
disclosure as “as the set of information items that relate to a firm's past, current and future environmental 
management activities and performance…and the past, current and future financial implications resulting 
from a firm's environmental management decisions or action” (p. 1). Even with the emerging efforts to 
standardize social and environmental reporting, most notably the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the 
disclosure of environmental information remains varied across firms.   
Voluntary environmental disclosures (VED) are quantitative and qualitative non-financial measures 
related to firm-specific environmental issues that provide information beyond that which is required by law.  
VEDs can address a broad range of environmental issues the firm is confronting in its activities, including 
procurement, manufacturing, selling, marketing, and other operational elements (Marshall & Brown, 2003).  
The quality of VED is at least partially determined by the form of indicators used to report environmental 
information (SustainAbility 2002).  For example, indicators may present (1) total waste discharged to water, 
(2) waste discharged to water per unit of production, and/or (3) predicted waste discharged to water per 
unit of future production.  These three indicators differ in information quality, such that a stakeholder is 
better informed about the environmental performance of the firm when the information is presented as a 
ratio to production; and even better informed when the information is presented as commitment to future 
discharges. In this study we examine the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures. 
Environmental disclosures may be released in a Corporate Environmental Report (CER), as a 
component of a ‘sustainability’ report or environmental, health, and safety report, or as disclosures included 
in the annual report or 10K.  Prior research to date has looked at the quality of these disclosures in a 
general manner (Marshall & Brown, 2003; Lober, Bynum, Campbell & Jacques, 1997; Stanwick & 
Stanwick, 2000; Noci, 2000; Thomas & Kenny, 1996). However, a detailed analysis of the variation in the 
quality of environmental disclosures has been lacking. Plumlee, et al. (2007) provide a general analysis of 
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firm valuation as it relates to overall VED quality. We build upon this by identifying broad categories of VED 
quality and relating them to stakeholder engagement. 
Drivers of Voluntary Environmental Disclosures.  Motivations for voluntary environmental 
disclosure are generally categorized as cost-benefit or legitimacy based (Berthelot et al., 2003).  From a 
cost-benefit perspective, evidence suggests that firms tend to disclose less when 1) there is considerable 
uncertainty about the information that is withheld (Bewtey & Li, 2000), 2) a firm faces serious environmental 
problems (Li et al., 1997), and 3) firms are in financial distress (Cormier & Magnan,1997).  From a 
legitimacy perspective, some researchers argue that VED provides legitimacy to environmental 
management efforts and prevents social and government sanctions (Deegan et al., 2002; Neu et al., 1998). 
Overall, existing research suggests that firms' VED increases with: firm size (Bewtey & Li, 2000; 
Deegan & Gordon, 1996), membership in environmentally-sensitive industries (Patten, 1990, 1992), the 
extent to which a firm is widely-held (Patten, 1992; Cormier & Magnan, 1997, 2003), a firm’s exposure to 
environmently-related legal proceedings (Deegan & Rankin, 1996), media exposure to a firms’ 
environmental activities (Neu et al., 1998; Li et al., 1997), the probability of continuing to have similar 
environmental accidents in the future (Waiden & Schwartz, 1997), and the extent to which environmental 
lobby groups express concern about the firm’s environmental performance (Deegan & Gordon, 1996).  We 
found no evidence of research considering the possible influence of engagement with corporate citizenship-
oriented NGOs on VED. 
 Next, we discuss the role corporate engagement with NGOs can play in influencing corporate 
disclosure of environmental information and derive a set of hypotheses from this discussion. 
Corporate Engagement with Citizenship NGOs 
 Maignan & Ferrell (2000) define corporate citizenship (CC) as “the extent to which businesses 
meet the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibility imposed on them by their stakeholders” 
(p. 284).  As a technique for engagement with society, corporate citizenship entails proactive engagement 
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with stakeholders.  Proactive engagement across sector lines, including partnerships with non-
governmental organizations (NGO) and public agencies, generally calls for corporate leadership that 
understands and embraces the firm’s global interconnectedness (Altman & Vidaver-Cohen, 2000; Carroll, 
1998; Davenport, 2000).  In this paper we examine corporate citizenship engagement in the context of 
firms’ cross-sector partnering with NGOs2 who identify the environment as one of their primary issues of 
focus. 
As firms interact more frequently and intensely with external stakeholders, they become more 
adept and willing to interact with these groups.  Mirvis and Googins (2006) suggest five stages of corporate 
citizenship:  elementary, engaged, innovative, integrated, and transformative.  These stages are 
differentiated, to a significant degree, on the firm’s engagement with external stakeholders.  The stages 
range from limited or one-way interaction with external stakeholders at the elementary stage to extensive 
interaction and dialogue with other businesses, community groups and NGOs.  The stage-model suggests 
that firms increasingly incorporate partnerships with and communication to stakeholders as part of their 
corporate vision and business strategy.  It may be, therefore, that the more a firm interacts with corporate 
citizenship-oriented stakeholders, the more willing it is to voluntarily disclose environmental information.  
Overall, we suggest that firms are more able and willing to disclose high quality environmental information 
when they engage more often with corporate citizenship oriented stakeholders. Corporate engagement with 
NGOs may lead to high quality VED. 
 
 
                                                 
2 In the general category of NGOs, we include some organizations that do not technically meet the definition of a 
non-governmental organization. A prime example is the Global Compact, which is a voluntary program that is 
sponsored by the United Nations. As it is sponsored by a league of governmental entities, it cannot be strictly 
considered to be an NGO. The Global Compact functions as an NGO, however, as it applies pressure on firms to 
voluntarily amend their activities. What we call NGOs, therefore, will include a number of similar-behaving multi-
stakeholder initiatives as well as organizations that meet a stricter definition of NGO. We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for this insight. 
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Principles- and Skills-Focused NGOs   
Distinguishing between two types of NGOs further illuminates the argument for a relationship 
between NGO engagement and the quality of VED.  In this paper we differentiate between NGOs that focus 
primarily on principles of corporate environmental citizenship and those that focus largely on skill-building 
for corporate environmental stewardship.3  Examples of principles-focused NGOs include the UN’s Global 
Compact, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) and Business for Social 
Responsibility.  These NGOs primary function is to create and promote a set of principles for CC behavior.   
For example, the Global Compact is “a purely voluntary initiative” with two objectives, including (1) 
internalizing “…the Compact and its principles by making them part of business strategy and operations” 
and (2) “…facilitate co-operation and collective problem-solving between different stakeholders” (Kell, 2003, 
p. 36).  The objective of obtaining adoption of a set of principles is to ‘set in motion changes to business 
operations’ based on the principles.  Often the decision to engage with a principles-focused NGO entails a 
commitment by top management.  Adoption of the CERES Principles, for example, requires “(e)xecutive-
level commitment to improve environmental and social performance using the Ceres Principles as a 
starting point” (www.ceres.org, accessed June 23, 2006).  Similarly, participation in the Global Compact 
requires a letter to the UN Secretary General from the CEO expressing support the Compact’s ten 
principles.  In summary, engagement with a principles-focused NGO involves commitment by top 
management to a set of principles and the integration of the principles into strategic decision-making.    
While principles-focused NGOs focus on principles that guide firms’ environmental objectives, 
NGOs focused on skill-building for environmental stewardship develop and disseminate specific 
knowledge, skills, and methods for actually managing firms’ environmental impacts.  The Global 
                                                 
3 Clearly, the distinction between principles-based and skills-based foci for NGOs is an oversimplification. Many 
NGOs’ missions lie somewhere between being purely principles-based and purely skills-based. Nonetheless, we 
identify NGOs as occupying the extreme poles of this gradient for purposes of analysis. The relevant factor is the 
corporate response to the NGO…does a corporate entity look to the NGO as a source of principles by which to 
engage or a source of technical skills with which to engage? 
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Environmental Management Initiative (GEMI), the Corporate Environmental Responsibility Center of the 
Earthwatch Institute, and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBSCD) are examples of 
skill-building NGOs.   Although these NGOs are founded on similar principles as advocated by principles-
focused NGOs, they focus more directly on knowledge enhancement and skill building to improve firms’ 
environmental stewardship performance.  For example, GEMI’s mission statement is “(b)usiness helping 
business improve environmental, health & safety performance, shareholder value and corporate 
citizenship” (GEMI, accessed June 21, 2006).  To achieve its mission, GEMI has developed a number of 
interactive tools dealing with supply chain management, integration of sustainable development into 
business processes, and water conservation and climate change initiatives (GEMI, 2004).  Similarly, the 
WBCSD’s Energy and Climate project develops methods for business to address global warming, in 
particular by development practical mechanisms, measurement tools, and market-based solutions.  Firms 
who engage with skill-focused NGOs are likely to gain specific environmental knowledge necessary for 
improving and reporting environmental performance.  Further, a firm’s involvement with skills-focused 
NGOs is usually at the business operations level rather than the top management.  While it would be 
unusual for a company to engage with skills-focused NGOs without at least the tacit assent of top 
management, the operations level personnel are more likely to be closely involved with the implementation 
and use of GEMI’s water conservation tools, WBCSD’s climate change measurement tools, or Earthwatch 
Institute’s field work on specific corporate environmental programs.  Thus, in contrast to corporate 
engagement with principles-focused NGOs, partnerships with skill-focused NGOs generally entail the 
development of operational level environmental knowledge and the direct involvement of operational level 
personnel.   
Overall, the engagement with and integration of both principles- and skills-focused NGOs into the 
business permits the attainment of knowledge and skills important to the pursuit of an environmental 
strategy (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003).  However, we argue that the types of NGOs with which a 
 7
 
company partners will be differentially related to the quality of environmental information it discloses.   The 
ability to internalize relatively sophisticated knowledge related to strategic and operational environmental 
issues through engagement with skills-focused NGOs, vis-à-vis principles-focused NGOs, will likely make 
firms more capable of collecting and managing the information necessary for high quality disclosures of 
environmental information (Brown et al., 2005).   
Hypothesis 1a: Corporate engagement with principles- and skills-focused NGOs will be positively 
related to high quality voluntary environmental disclosure. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Corporate engagement with skills-focused NGOs will be positively related to higher 
quality voluntary environmental disclosure than corporate engagement with principles-focused NGOs. 
 Next, we discuss the roles institutional investors can play in influencing corporate disclosure of 
environmental information and derive a set of hypotheses from this discussion. 
Institutional Investor Activism 
Investor activism is defined by Ryan and Schneider (2002) as “the use of power by an investor 
either to influence the processes or outcomes of a given portfolio firm or to evoke large-scale change in … 
multiple firms through symbolic targeting of one or more portfolio firms” (p. 555).  Activism can take a 
variety of forms – from cooperative, such as behind-the-scenes dialogue and meeting with top 
management to adversarial such as proxy voting and shareholder resolutions (Waddock, 2000).  The role 
of investor activism in the US governance system has risen dramatically over the past two decades – to the 
extent that Clark and Hebb (2004) characterize engagement by shareholders, in particular pension funds, 
as the fifth stage of capitalism. 
When corporate management confronts a possible resolution, it often undertakes negotiations with 
the sponsor or co-sponsors to see if the resolution may be withdrawn (Smith, 2005).  In cases where a 
resolution is withdrawn prior to a proxy vote it is often the result of negotiated agreements on the key issue 
between the sponsor and the firm.  In this case, withdrawn resolutions provide evidence consistent with 
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management’s engagement with activist investors. Historically it is less common for investor activism to 
reach the stage of proxy voting and shareholder resolutions. However, this trend may be changing, 
particularly in regard to ‘hot’ topics such as reporting on greenhouse gas emissions (Graves, Rehbein & 
Waddock, 2001). For example, in the 2005-2006 filing season, 30 shareholder resolutions were filed with a 
focus on global warming, while seven resolutions were withdrawn after companies agreed to undertake 
climate risk assessments and committed to specific greenhouse reduction targets (CERES, 2005). 
Previous research regarding the influence of institutional investors on firms’ decision-making 
indicates that the mere filing of a resolution often signals the failure of sponsor-management dialogue to 
reach agreement on the disputed issue (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Tihanyi et al., 
2003).  The subsequent withdrawal of a resolution, however, generally indicates that agreement has been 
reached on corporate actions to deal with the issue under consideration prior to the proxy vote. If a 
resolution is disqualified by the SEC it suggests that the target company’s argument against the resolution 
succeeded on technical grounds.  Finally, if the resolution reaches the proxy voting stage at the annual 
shareholder meeting, then no agreement was reached and the sponsor is provided an opportunity to speak 
to the shareholders present at the annual meeting regarding the resolution issue.  Proxy voting represents 
a contentious form of engagement and dialogue; sponsors and corporate management prepare and 
present arguments for and against the resolution, respectively.  Thus, resolutions provide an opportunity for 
the sponsor to gain greater attention for the issue among the firm’s shareholders as well as generate 
broader publicity (Waddock, 2000).  Withdrawn resolutions suggest a sense of comprise through dialogue 
whereas disqualification and proxy voting present more acrimonious forms of engagement.  Based on 
these considerations, we suggest that following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a:  The number of withdrawn shareholder resolutions dealing with environmental issues is 
positively related to a firm’s quality of voluntary environmental disclosures. 
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Hypothesis 2b: The number of shareholder resolutions dealing with environmental issues disqualified is 
negatively related to a firm’s quality of voluntary environmental disclosures. 
Hypothesis 2c: The number of shareholder resolutions dealing with environmental issues voted on at 
shareholder meetings is negatively related to a firm’s quality of voluntary environmental disclosures. 
 In summary, our hypotheses suggest that several forms of engagement between firms and external 
stakeholders are associated with the quality of VED.  We suggest that firm engagement with NGOs, 
particularly skills-focused NGOs, leads to higher quality disclosure and that firm engagement with activist 
shareholders leading to the withdrawal of a resolution will lead to higher quality disclosure. We also suggest 
the disqualification of and proxy voting on shareholder resolutions is negatively related to VED quality.  
Next, we discuss the research methods, analyses and results from the hypotheses testing. 
Methods 
Sample  
To test our hypotheses, we included five industries in our sample: (1) chemical, (2) oil and gas, (3) 
utilities (electrical), (4) pharmaceutical and biotech, and (5) food and beverage.  These industries provide a 
contrast of higher to lower polluters, based on the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database (Christman, 
2000; Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Kassinis & Vafeas).  Based on TRI data averaged for years 2000, 2001 and 
2002 on total reported chemical releases and waste produced, chemical and electric utilities represent high 
polluters, oil and gas and food and beverage represent middle range polluters, and pharmaceutical and 
biotech represents a low polluter.  Including industries across reported levels of pollution provides a 
comparison of firms that might be differentially driven to voluntarily disclose environmental information.  The 
firms were drawn from the Dow Jones Global Index.  From the 416 firms across the five industries, we 
identified 183 firms, representing 549 firm-years, from which to obtain information to complete our 
disclosure index. Unavailability of control variables lead to the deletion of 70 firm-years, primarily due to 
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firm mergers, acquisitions and dissolutions.  The final data set included 479 firm-years over the three year 
time period4. 
Measures 
Quality of Voluntary Environmental Disclosure.  Our dependent variable is the quality of voluntary 
environmental disclosure. We used primary data regarding the VED of publicly traded companies using a 
self-constructed VED index (see Plumlee et al. 2007).  The index (hereinafter called the BMP index, per 
Plumlee et al. 2007) provided a listing of observations relating to environmental disclosures by the target 
firm. For each firm in the initial sample, the BMP index provided three years of environmental data (2000, 
2001, and 2002) consisting of over 300 possible environmental observations from 62 attributes for each 
year.  From the environmental management literature (Aragon-Correa, 1998; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Hart, 
1995; Starik & Rands, 1995; Roome, 1992), we identified four levels of environmental strategy that are 
reflected in environmental disclosures: compliance, pollution prevention, product stewardship and 
ecological sustainability.  Progression from one to the next strategy requires building socially complex 
competencies, taking an increasingly holistic approach to product design, production and marketing, 
incorporating stakeholders into strategic decision-making, and creating and relying upon a vision based in 
environmental stewardship.  Disclosures of environmental information through indicators representative of 
these four levels display increasing levels of sophistication in understanding, measuring and 
communicating environmental strategy.  We identify the disclosure quality at each level of environmental 
strategy (compliance, pollution prevention, product stewardship, ecological sustainability) by the total 
number of observations from the BMP index at each level for each firm-year. 
Now we describe the process for determining which indicators from the BMP index relate to each 
of the four levels of disclosure quality. First, we identified the strategic quality related to the observations of 
specific environmental attributes from academic (Brown, et al. 2005, Wiseman 1982) and practitioner/ 
                                                 
4 For further information about the sample, see Plumlee, et al. 2007. 
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consulting literature (e.g., SustainAbility 2002, AccountAbility 2003).  For example, environmental indicators 
of using renewable energy sources relate to product stewardship (minimizing environmental life-cycle 
costs) while environmental indicators of reduced per-unit traditional energy use relate to pollution 
prevention (minimizing waste). Considering the character of each of the four categories of disclosure quality 
and the primary focus of each of the BMP index indicators, we drafted a preliminary coding scheme. The 
coding scheme was pre-tested using randomly selected corporate environmental reports and two of the 
authors independently identified discrepancies in the coding scheme to resolve differences and finalize the 
index. The index was then run on the BMP index data and the firm-year scores for each level of disclosure 
quality were determined. 
Corporate Engagement with NGOs.  The process for measuring corporate NGO engagement 
entailed six steps.  Our first task was to compile a comprehensive list of environmental/citizenship NGOs 
that met the following criteria: (1) be U.S. or U.S./international in focus (not strictly local or regional), (2) 
have environmental as a key aspect of its principles and/or programs, (3) maintain corporate partnerships 
as an important part of its outreach and, (4) be non-industry specific (engage with corporations from a 
diversity of industries).  These criteria minimize the potential bias in terms of the opportunity for all firms in 
our sample, regardless of size or geographic scope, to partner with the selected NGOs.  To construct our 
initial set of NGOs, three lists were used – from the Center for Corporate Citizenship (Boston College), the 
National Environmental Database, and Duke University-Perkin’s Library’s ‘NGOs: Environmentally 
Sustainable Development’ database.  A total of 18 NGOs met the four criteria set above. 
Second, based on Internet and archival documentation, we clarified the primary purpose of NGO.  
Using the stated missions and primary activities of the NGOs, we classified each of the NGOs as either 
principles-focused or skills-focused.  Third, we collected corporate signatory/membership list from NGOs 
for years 2000, 2001 and 2002.  We then cross-referenced the signatory/membership status information 
through archival searches of corporate websites, publications, press releases, etc and eliminated any 
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incomplete or mismatched data.  Based on the first three steps, we identified three principles- and five 
skills-focused NGOs with which at least 2 firms in our sample were engaged during the years 2000, 2001 
and/or 2002. For the purposes of this study, the principles-focused NGOs include: Business for Social 
Responsibility, Coalition for Environmental Responsible Economies and UN Global Compact; the skills-
focused NGOs include: Earthwatch Institute, Environmental Defense, Global Environmental Management 
Initiative, World Business Council for Sustainable Development and World Resources Institute.  Fourth, we 
identified each firm-year in which a firm was engaged with a particular NGO.  Finally, we summed both the 
number of principles- and skills-focused NGOs each firm was engaged with for years 2000, 2001 and 2002.  
The continuous variables for principles-focused NGO engagement and skills-focused NGO engagement 
are designated as Principles and Skills, respectively.  A continuous variable for the aggregate NGO 
engagement was created as the sum of the Principles and Skills variables and is designated as All_NGOS. 
 Institutional Investor Activism.  In this paper we focus on the outcomes of institutional activism 
once a resolution is filed as an indicator of corporate engagement with activist institutional investors.  
Although previous research on investor activism has considered the initiation of a shareholder proposal and 
proxy contests (David, et al., 2001), we focus on the outcomes of resolution filings based on the three 
stages described earlier where the outcomes serve as proxies for the results of negotiations between the 
sponsor and firm management (see Carleton et al (1998).  The variables used in the analysis are 
Withdrawn, the number of resolutions withdrawn in a firm-year; Disqualified, the number of resolutions 
disqualified in a firm-year; Voted, number of resolutions brought to a proxy vote in a firm-year.  These data 
were collected from the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR: http://www.iccr.org/).  The 
ICCR records information regarding all shareholder resolutions filed each year in the US dealing with social 
and environmental issues filed, including the target company, sponsor(s), description of the resolution 
issue, date of filing, and the status of the resolution (withdrawn, disqualified, voted on). 
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Control Variables.  Based on previous literature (Bewtey & Li, 2000; Bansal & Clelland, 2000; 
Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Johnson & Greening, 1999), we incorporated measures of firm size and 
profitability into our analysis.  Organizational size is represented by the logarithms of Total Assets and Total 
Sales.  Proxies for profitability include return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS).  These data were 
obtained from Compustat for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002.  Because of the high correlations between 
the organizational size variables (0.90) and profitability variables (0.59), we included only one of each – 
Total Sales and ROA, respectively – in our statistical analyses. We also coded the five industries with 
dummy variables. 
 Analysis 
We used a series of standard linear regression models to examine the effects of corporate NGO 
engagement and institutional investor activism on the quality of VED. Table 1 presents the Spearman 
correlation matrix and descriptive statistics.  Tables 2 and present the results for our regression model 
analyses for the four levels of quality of VED, compliance, pollution prevention, product stewardship and 
ecological sustainability, respectively.  Table 2 shows the results for the regression against All_NGOS 
whereas Table 3 reveals the results for the regression against Principles and Skills variables.  For each 
VED level in both sets of analyses, we ran two models. The first included the dummy variables for 
chemical, electric utilities, oil & gas and food & beverage; the second replaced food & beverage with 
pharmaceutical. 
Hypothesis 1a examines the relationship between NGO-corporate engagement and the quality of 
VED.  It suggests that corporate engagement with both principles- and skills-focused NGOs will lead to 
higher quality VED. Our analysis in Table 1 shows that greater engagement with NGOs (both principles- 
and skill-focused) is related to higher quality VED at all levels, consistent with hypothesis 1a.  Hypothesis 
1b states that firms that engage with skills-focused NGOs will have quality disclosure than those that 
engage with principles-focused NGOs.  Our results shown in Table 2 indicate that principles-focused 
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engagement is positive and significant in relation to compliance VED, but not significantly related to higher 
levels of VED.  Skills-focused engagement is significant and positive in relation to VED at all four levels.  
Thus, we find support for hypotheses 1a and 1b.  
Hypotheses 2a, b, and c consider the relationship between the outcomes of shareholder activism 
and the quality of VED.  The process of formulating, filing, and negotiating around shareholder resolutions 
represent corporate engagement with shareholder activists.  For Hypothesis 2a, both Tables 1 and 2 show 
that the number of withdrawn resolutions is significantly and positively related to disclosure of compliance, 
pollution prevention, and product stewardship VED and not significantly related to ecological stewardship 
VED.  Overall, these results suggest that withdrawal of a resolution prior to proxy voting is consistent with 
higher VED quality.  Hypothesis 2b stated that the number of disqualified resolutions is negatively related to 
the quality of VED.  The results in Tables 1 and 2 show that disqualification was found to not be significant 
for all levels of VED, providing no support for this hypothesis.  H2c proposes that the number of resolutions 
going to a proxy contest is negatively related to VED quality.  In both Tables 1 and 2 the results suggest no 
support for this H2c at any level of VED quality.  In summary, the only outcome of environmental 
shareholder resolutions significantly related to higher quality VED is the number of resolutions withdrawn.  
H2a is supported; H2b and c are not. 
Our results suggest that engagement with skills-focused NGOs and with investor activists prior to 
proxy contests are strong predictors of the quality of VED.  In the following section we will discuss the 
implications of our findings. 
DISCUSSION 
 Corporations are faced with increasing pressures from a number of external stakeholders to 
improve their corporate citizenship behaviors.  To a noticeable extent, many companies have responded by 
engaging with external stakeholders in less adversarial, more collaborative relations, leading to the 
potential for ‘negotiated’ solutions to enhanced corporate citizenship.  Transparency through disclosure of 
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environmental impacts and performance is considered by many to be a key aspect of corporate citizenship.  
This study examined aspects of the relationships between firms and two external stakeholders groups, 
corporate citizenship NGOs and investor activists, and the quality of their VED.  In recent times, these 
specific external stakeholder groups have been particularly interested in higher quality disclosure by firms 
and our findings suggest that ‘negotiated’ transparency is rising, in particular in the interaction of 
corporations with skills-focused NGOs and in the dialogue with shareholder activists prior to resolution 
proxy contests. 
Corporate-NGO Engagement 
Businesses often make decisions that ignore their long term impacts, making it essential that they 
develop environmentally responsible information systems to meet the growing environmental requirements 
imposed by society and by natural systems (Brown et al., 2005).  NGOs engaged in corporate citizenship 
activities, particularly those with a focus on knowledge and capability enhancement can play a key role in 
assisting business build these systems.  Our research suggests that corporate engagement with skills-
focused NGOs is strongly related to the quality of environmental disclosure.  Meeting the environmental 
imperatives of the future requires better and richer information, which depends on the integration of 
information systems, organizations, and environmental initiatives (Allenby et al., 2001).  We suggest that  
interactions with skills-focused NGOs (1) provides the firm with better systems and knowledge for collecting 
environmental information (Brown et al., 2005) and (2) encourages firms to externally report this 
information.  While corporate engagement with principles-focused NGOs was significant only at the level of 
compliance VED, this does not suggest an unimportant role for principles-focused NGOs regarding 
corporate transparency.  Voluntary externally reporting of non-financial information occurs only with top 
management consent; the number of firms in the world providing VED remains fairly small (KPMG, 2005) 
and the principles-focused NGOs may serve to engage a broader audience of corporate management 
regarding the value of transparency (Lazlo et al., 2005).  Principles- and skill-focused NGOs, we suggest, 
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offer complementary roles in furthering disclosure of environmental (and social) information by engaging 
the corporate sector at all levels – building association and understanding with top management and 
knowledge and capacity building with operational personnel. 
 
Shareholder Activism 
Our results suggest that negotiations between the shareholder activists and target companies that 
lead to the withdrawal of resolutions are related to higher quality VED.    Shareholder activists, in the role of 
external monitors of corporate behavior, are increasingly able to wield the resolution as a threat to 
reputation but also as a prod to engage in dialogue (Graves et al., 2001; Waddock, 2000).  Counter to our 
expectations, proxy voting does not lead to lower quality disclosure; these results may suggest that, in the 
context of the collaborative-conflict tension between shareholder activists and corporate management, a 
proxy contest represents a ‘stalemate’ in the engagement process.  If a resolution reaches proxy vote, the 
resolution sponsors and corporate management failed to reach an agreed solution; as a result 
management may simply maintain the status quo in terms of reporting and disclosure quality and, thus, we 
would see no relationship between proxy contests and the quality of disclosure (Geltman & Skroback, 
1997).   
Clark and Hebb (2004) posit a larger, more influential role for institutional investors in monitoring 
and control of corporate behavior and performance in modern capitalist societies.   Our study highlights 
how investor activism may play out under these contexts – shareholder activism is a means to persuade 
managers to focus on a firm’s long-term prospects and it is the collaborative-conflict tension that the 
pushes both the activists and managers to engage in dialogue prior to the proxy contest (Carleton et al., 
1998).  Management may not negotiate in the absence of the threat of a resolution and working against the 
resolution before and during a proxy vote with shareholders is costly and better avoided (Millstein, 1991).  
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Thus, our findings are consistent with the idea that shareholder activism provides an important avenue for 
negotiated transparency between members of the investment community and corporations. 
CONCLUSION 
 While corporate actors are faced with increased pressures from external stakeholders for 
enhancing citizenship-based policies and actions, they are also engaging with these stakeholders in more 
direct dialogue, knowledge-sharing and negotiated solutions.  These developments occur with both the 
citizenship NGO and shareholder activist communities and they appear to be related to higher quality 
disclosure of environmental information by the corporate sector.  Because of the serious risks and liabilities 
associated with environmental issues and performance, disclosure of environmental information is 
becoming more common (KPMG 2005, Kolk 2004).  If corporate citizenship becomes increasingly accepted 
as a corporate imperative and engagement with skills-focused NGOs increases, corporations will develop 
greater competencies to measure, collect and report high quality environmental (and social) information.  
As the quality of disclosure improves, a diverse set of stakeholders, including employees, shareholders, 
consumers, community groups, and regulators, will be better able to make well-informed decisions 
regarding where to work, what shares to hold, what products and services to purchase, and what 
companies to welcome into their neighborhoods.   A pre-condition of a sustainable and equitable society is 
transparency, in word and deed; the results in this paper suggest that corporate citizenship efforts, by 
means of engagement and dialogue, may be useful in driving higher quality disclosure through ‘negotiated 
transparency’.   
 
References 
Accountability (2003) ‘AA1000 Assurance Standards’, Accountability: London, UK. 40p. 
Aguilera, R. V. (2005) ‘Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: An Institutional Comparative 
Perspective,’ British Journal of Management (Supplement 1) 16: 39-53.
 18
 
Altman, B. W. and D. Vidaver-Cohen (2000) ‘A Framework for Understanding Corporate Citizenship: 
Introduction to the Special Edition of Business and Society Review - Corporate Citizenship and the 
New Millennium’, Business and Society Review 105: 1-7. 
Aragón-Correa, J. A. and S. Sharma (2003) ‘A Contingent Resource-based View of Proactive Corporate 
Environmental Strategy’, Academy of Management Review 28.1: 71-78. 
Bansal, P. and I. Clelland (2004) ‘Talking Trash: Legitimacy, Impression Management, and Unsystematic 
Risk in the Contxt of the Natural Environment’, Academy of Management Journal 47.1: 93-103. 
Bansal, P. and K. Roth (2000) ‘Why Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological Responsiveness’, 
Academy of Management Journal 13.4: 717-736. 
Berthelot, S., D. Cormier and M. Magnan (2003) ‘Environmental Disclosure Research: Review and 
Synthesis’, Journal of Accounting Literature 22: p1-44 
Bewtey, K. and Y. Li (2000) ‘Disclosure of Environmental Information by Canadian Manufacturing 
Companies: A Voluntary Disclosure Perspective’, Advances in Environmental Accounting & 
Management 1: 201-226. 
Brown, D., J. Dillard and R. S. Marshall (2005) ‘Strategically Informed, Environmentally Conscious 
Information Requirements for Accounting Information Systems’,  Journal of Information Systems 19 (2): 
79-104. 
Busco, C., M.L. Frigo, E. Giovannoni, A. Riccaboni and R.W. Scapens (2005) ‘Beyond Compliance: Why 
Integrated Governance Matters Today’, Strategic Finance 87.2: 35-43. 
Carroll, A. B. (1998) ‘The Four Faces of Corporate Citizenship’, Business and Society Review 100: 1-7. 
CERES. 2005. U.S. companies face record number of global warming shareholder resolutions on wider 
range of business sectors. February 17. 
Clark, G. L. and T. Hebb (2004) ‘Pension Fund Corporate Engagement: The Fifth Stage of Capitalism’, 
Industrial Relations 59.1: 142-171. 
Cormier, D. and M. Magnan (1997) ‘Investors' Assessment of Implicit Environmental Liabilities: An 
Empirical Investigation’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 16: 215-241. 
Cormier, D. and M. Magnan (2003) ‘Environmental Reporting Management: A Continental European 
Perspective’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22: 43-62. 
Davenport, K. (2000) ‘Corporate Citizenship: A Stakeholder Approach for Defining Corporate Social 
Performance and Identifying Measures for Assessing It’, Business & Society 39: 210-219. 
Deegan, C. and B. Gordon (1996) ‘A Study of Environmental Disclosure Practices of Australian 
Corporations’, Accounting and Business Research 26.3: 187-199. 
Deegan, C. and M. Rankin (1996) ‘Do Australian Companies Report Environmental News Objectively? An 
Analysis of Environmental Disclosures by Firms Prosecuted Successfully by the Environmental 
Protection Authority’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 9.2: 50-67. 
Deegan, C., M. Rankin and J. Tobin (2002) ‘An Examination of Corporate Social and Environmental 
Disclosures of BHP from 1983-1997: A Test of Legitimacy Theory’, Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal 15.3: 312-343. 
 19
 
Demsetz, H. (1983) ‘The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Law & Economics 
26.2: 375-390. 
Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn (1985) ‘The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences’, 
Journal of Political Economy 93: 1155-1177. 
Fombrun, C. J. (2006) ‘Corporate Governance’, Corporate Reputation Review 8.4: 267-271. 
GEMI (2004) Clear Advantage: Building Shareholder Value, Global Environmental Management Initiative.
Graves, S. B., K. Rehbein, K. and S. Waddock (2001) ‘Fad and Fashion in Shareholder Activism: The 
Landscape of Shareholder Resolutions, 1988–1998’, Business & Society Review 106.4: 293-315. 
Hart, S. L. (1995) ‘A Natural-Resource Based View of the Firm’, Academy of Management Journal 37: 986-
1014. 
Hoskisson, R. E., M. A. Hitt, R.A. Johnson and W. Grossman (2002) ‘Conflicting Voices: The Effects of 
Institutional Ownership Heterogeneity and Internal Governance on Corporate Innovation Strategies’, 
Academy of Management Journal 43.4: 697-716. 
Ingley, C. B. and N.T. van der Walt (2004) ‘Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Conflicts of 
Interest’, Corporate Governance 12.4: 534-551. 
Johnson, R. A. and D.W. Greening (1999) ‘The Effects of Corporate Governance and Institutional 
Ownership Types on Corporate Social Performance’, Academy of Management Journal 42.5: 564-576. 
Kell, G. (2003) ‘The Global Compact: Origins, Operations, Progress, Challenges’, Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship 11: 35-47. 
Kolk, A. (2004) ‘A decade of sustainability reporting: developments and significance’. International Journal 
of  Environment and Sustainable Development. 3(1): 51-63. 
KPMG (2005) ‘KPMG International Survey of Corporate Sustainability Reporting 2005’, (KPMG. 
Amsterdam, Netherlands). 
Lazlo, C., D. Sherman, J. Whalen and J. Ellison (2005) ‘Expanding the Value Horizon: How Stakeholder 
Value Contributes to Competitive Advantage’, Journal of Corporate Citizenship 20: 65-76. 
Li, Y., G. Richardson and D. Thornton (1997) ‘Corporate Disclosure of Environmental Liability Information: 
Theory and Evidence’, Contemporary Accounting Research 14.3: 435-474. 
Maignan, I., and O.C. Ferrell (2000) ‘Measuring Corporate Citizenship in Two Countries: The Case of the 
United States and France’, Journal of Business Ethics 23: 283-297. 
Marshall, R. S. and D. Brown (2003) ‘Corporate Environmental Reporting: What's in a Metric?’, Business 
Strategy and the Environment 12.2: 87-106. 
Millstein, I. A. (1991) ‘The Responsibility of the Institutional Investor in Corporate Management,   in A. W. 
Sametz (Ed.), The Battle for Corporate Control: Shareholder Rights, Stakeholder Interests, and 
Managerial Responsibilities (Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin): 67-76. 
Mirvis, P. and B. Googins (2006) ‘Stages of Corporate Citizenship’, California Management Review 48.2: 
104-126.
Neu, D., H. Warsame and K. Pedwell (1998) ‘Managing Public Impressions: Environmental Disclosures in 
Annual Reports’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 23.3: 265-28. 
 20
 
O’Connell, L. L., C.U. Stephens, M. Betz, J.M. Shepard and J.R. Hendry (2005) ‘An Organizational Field 
Approach to Corporate Rationality: The Role of Stakeholder Activism’, Business Ethics Quarterly 15.1: 
93-111. 
Patten, D. M. (1990) ‘The Market Reaction to Social Responsibility Disclosures: The Case of the Sullivan 
Principles Signings’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 15.6: 575-587. 
Patten, D. M. (1992) ‘Intra-industry Environmental Disclosures in Response to the Alaskan Oil Spill: A Note 
on Legitimacy Theory’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 17.5: 471-475. 
Perrini, F. (2006) ‘The Practitioner’s Perspective on Non-Financial Reporting’, California Management 
Review 48.2: 73-103.
Plante, C. S. and J. Bendell (1998) ‘The Art of Collaboration: Lessons from Emerging Environmental 
Businesses-NGO Partnerships in Asia’, Greener Management International 24: 91-140. 
Plumlee, M., Brown, D., and R. Scott Marshall. (2007) “The Impact of Voluntary Environmental Disclosures 
on Firm Value”. Working paper, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=992269. 
Roome, N. (1992) ‘Developing Environmental Management Systems’, Business Strategy and the 
Environment 1: 11-24.  
Ryan, L. V. and M. Schneider (2002) ‘The Antecedents of Institutional Activism’, Academy of Management 
Review 27.4: 554-573. 
Smith, T. (2005) ‘Institutional and Social Investors Find Common Ground’, Journal of Investing 14.3: 57-65. 
Stapledon, G. P. (1996) Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
SustainAbility (2002) Trust us: The global reporters 2002 survey of corporate sustainability reporting. 
SustainAbility, Ltd. London, UK. 66p. 
Tihanyi, L., R. A. Johnson, R.E. Hoskisson, and M.A. Hitt (2003) ‘Institutional Ownership Differences and 
International Diversification: The Effects of Boards of Directors and Technological Opportunity’, 
Academy of Management Journal 46.2: 195-211. 
Waddock, S (2000) ‘The Multiple Bottom Lines of Corporate Citizenship: Social Investing, Reputation, and 


























Corporate-NGO Engagement and Institutional Activism  


















 Mean St. Dev. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. Principles .11 .89              
2. Skills .19 .45 .38**             
3. Withdrawn .02 .14 .03 .13**            
4. Disqualified .02 .12 .14** .14** -.02           
5. Voted .09 .35 .22** .14** .01 .17**          
6. ROA .16 .09 .14** .12* .05 .03 .04         
7. ROS .25 .20 -.02 -0.04 .03 -.02 -.03 .59**        
8. Total Sales 8.27 1.31 .31** .45** .10* .14** .33** .01 -.18**       
9. Total Assets 8.72 1.22 .27** .42** .12** .13** .33** -.15** -.03 .90**      
10. Chemical .14 .35 -.07 -.11* -.06 -.05 -.07 -.05 -.16** -.10* -.19**     
11. Electric Utilities .32 .47 -.06 -.14** .03 .03 .06 -.47** -.08 .16** .38** -.28**    
12. Oil & Gas .18 .39 .03 -.05 .04 -.01 .12* .32** .31** .08 .05 -.20** -.33**   
13. Food & Beverage .15 .36 .11* .10* -.02 .09* -.01 .15** -.19** .17** -.03 -.17** -.29** -.20**  
14. Pharmaceutical .20 .40 .01 .03 -.01 -.06 -.13** .15** .10* -.32** -.30** -.21** -.24** -.24** -.21** 
*   p < .05 















Regression Models for All NGOs and Environmental Disclosure Quality  
N=478 
 
Quality of Disclosure Compliance Pollution Prevention Product Stewardship Ecological Sustainability 
Models 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4c 
Standardized 
Coefficients         
Independent Variables         
All_NGOS .29*** .29*** .36*** .36*** .26*** .26*** .30*** .30*** 
Withdrawn .17*** .17*** .18*** .18*** .19*** .19*** .06 .06 
Disqualified -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 .06 .06 .01 .01 
Voted .10 .10 .03 -.03 .10† .10† .01 -.01 
ROA .02 .02 .04 .12 .09 .09* .06 .06 
Total Sales -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.06 -.06 -.02 -.02 
Chemical .11† .20*** .11† .20** .06 .06 -.03 .13* 
Electric Utilities .19** .32*** .21*** .32*** .30*** .30*** -.11† .07 
Oil & Gas .06 .17** .06 .17** .03 .03 -.09 .06 
Food & Beverage -.09   -.06  -.01  -.13†  
Pharmaceutical  .11†  .11†  .01  .15* 
Model Summary         
R2 .18 .18 .21 .21 .19 .21 .12 .12 
Adjusted R2 .16 .16 .19 .19 .18 .19 .10 .10 
F 10.01*** 10.01*** 12.43*** 12.43*** 11.15*** 8.84*** 6.43*** 6.43*** 
 
†  p < .10 
*  p < .05 
** p < .01 






Regression Models for Principles- and Skills-Focused NGOs and Environmental Disclosure Quality  
N=478 
 
Quality of Disclosure Compliance Pollution Prevention Product Stewardship Ecological Sustainability 
Models 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4c 
Standardized 
Coefficients         
Independent Variables         
Principles .09* .09* .06 .06 .07 .07 -.06 -.06 
Skills .17** .17** .28*** .28*** .16** .16** .32*** .32*** 
Withdrawn .17*** .17*** .17*** .17*** .18*** .18*** .03 .03 
Disqualified -.03 -.03 -.03 -.03 .06 .16 .01 .01 
Voted .06 .06 -.01 -.01 .04 .04 -.03 -.03 
ROA .10 .10 .12 .12 .20* .20* .17* .17* 
Total Sales .06 .06 .01 .01 -.04 -.04 -.11 -.11 
Chemical .08 .22*** .10† .18** .04 .08 -.03 .12* 
Electric Utilities .15* .34*** .16* .29*** .27*** .32*** -.15* .05 
Oil & Gas .04 .19** .03 .13* .01 .05 -.10† .07 
Food & Beverage -.14*   -.09†  -.04  -.15**  
Pharmaceutical  .16*  .11†  .04  .17** 
Model Summary         
R2 .19 .19 .24 .24 .21 .21 .18 .18 
Adjusted R2 .17 .17 .22 .22 .19 .19 .16 .16 
F 7.95*** 7.95*** 10.69*** 10.69*** 8.84*** 8.84*** 7.41*** 7.41*** 
†  p < .10 
*  p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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